Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (2000– )
2016

Zions First Naitonal Bank, Plaintiff-Appelle, v. Shayne D. Crapo,
Defendant-Appellant.
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Zions First National v Crapo, No. 20160218 (Utah Supreme Court, 2016).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/3278

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (2000– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons.
Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/
policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

PUBLIC

v.

Appellate Case No. 20160218-SC

SHAYNE D. CRAPO,

District Court Case No. 140907019

Defendant-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, from an Order Granting
Summary Judgment Before Honorable Barry Lawrence

BENNETT TUELLER
James K. Tracy
Millrock Park West Building
3165 E. Millrock Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
(801) 438-2000
Counsel for Appellee

KIRTON McCONKIE
Richard J. Armstrong
Thanksgiving Park Four
2600 W. Executive Parkway, Suite 400
Lehi, Utah 84004
(801) 328-3600
Counsel for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

ARGUMENT

1

I. GENUINE DISPUTES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST AS TO
WHETHER ZB WAS ESTOPPED FROM COLLECTING THE NOTE.

A.

A Genuine Dispute ofMaterial Fact Exists Relating to the
First Element ofEstoppel

1

2

B. A Genuine Dispute ofMaterial Fact Exists in Relation to the
Second Element ofEstoppel

4

C. A Genuine Dispute ofMaterial Fact Exists in Relation to the
Third Element ofEstoppel

5

II. CRAPO CREATED GENUINE DISPUTES OF FACT AS TO
WHETHER ZB ACTUALLY DISCHARGED CRAPO'S
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NOTE
CONCLUSION

7
9

WORD COUNT CERTIFICATION

10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

11

1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Coulter & Smith Ltd. v. Russell, 1999 UT App 055, 976 P.2d 1218
English v. Standard Optical Co., 841 P.2d 613 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979)
Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Nicholas, 812 A.2d 51 (Conn. Ct. App. 2002)
Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1996)
lXL. Stores Co. v. Success Markets, 97 P.2d 577 (Utah 1939)
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co., 2011 UT 33, 258 P.3d 539
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., 2003 UT 23, 70 P.3d 904
Whitaker v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 2008 UT App 282, 191 P.3d 814
Youngbloodv. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28,158 P.3d 1088

7
8
4
8
4,5
6
1
5
6
2,6

Statutes
UTAH CODE § 25-5-4(1)
UTAH CODE § 25-5-4(1)(f)
UTAH CODE § 25-5-4(2)(a)
UTAH CODE § 70a-3-604

8
7
7
8

11

ARGUMENT
This case presents a simple question to the Court: did the trial court err in granting
summary judgment in favor of a bank (ZB), allowing the bank to collect on a debt it told
the borrower (Crapo) was "FORGIVEN DEBT." The answer, of course, is yes. Crapo
created genuine issues of material fact as to whether ZB was estopped from collecting on
the Note at issue in this case and whether ZB actually discharged the debt. Because ZB
discharged the debt, took no action to collect the debt for nearly four years, and then
affirmatively told Crapo that his debt was forgiven, the trial court should have allowed
the case to go to the jury.
I. GENUINE DISPUTES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST AS TO WHETHER
ZB WAS ESTOPPED FROM COLLECTING THE NOTE.

As this Court is aware, estoppel is intended "to rescue from loss a party who has,
without fault, been deluded into a course of action by the wrong or neglect of another."
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co., 2011 UT 33, ~ 40,258 P.3d 539
(emphasis removed). In this case, Crapo has raised genuine issues of material fact as to
whether he was deluded into a course of action by the wrong or neglect of ZB.
Specifically, Crapo has created an issue of fact as to whether ZB's statement that the
Note was "FORGIVEN DEBT," in conjunction with ZB 's other statements and actions,
now estops ZB from collecting on that obligation. ZB argues in its opposition that there is
no dispute of fact and that it is not estopped from collecting the Note. However, ZB is
incorrect.

1

Under Utah law, a party is estopped from pursuing its claims if the following three
elements are met:
(1)

(2)

(3)

a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent
with a claim later asserted;
reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on
the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or failure to
act; and
injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first
party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or
failure to act.

Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, ~ 14, 158 P.3d 1088. As each element
is essential to an estoppel claim, a finding of a factual dispute as to one issue precludes a
court from granting summary judgment. Here, Crapo has created a genuine dispute of
material fact as to each of these elements, therefore, the trial court should be reversed.
A. A Genuine Dispute ofMaterial Fact Exists Relating to Whether ZB Made
Inconsistent Statements, Admissions, or Actions

In its opposition, ZB contends that the 1099-C, which described the Note as
"FORGIVEN," is not evidence of inconsistent conduct. According to ZB, there is nothing
inconsistent about telling a debtor that his debt is "FORGIVEN DEBT" and then
subsequently suing to collect that debt. To arrive at this conclusion, ZB focuses on the
IRS regulations that underpin the issuance ofa 1099-C. However, ZB's arguments miss
the mark.
ZB argues, for example, that the IRS does not view a 1099-C as an admission that
a debt has been discharged. See Opposition at 14. Moreover, ZB asserts that a 1099-C is
merely a reporting tool and is not used to effectuate a discharge of debt. Whether these
characterizations of the IRS's position are accurate is irrelevant to the issue at hand: the
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message ZB sent to Crapo. The message ZB sent to Crapo is undeniably inconsistent with
its position in the present action.
In Box 4 of the 1099-C, ZB affirmatively stated, "FORGIVEN DEBT AMT 3
YEARS NO PAYMENT." (Rec. 308) The IRS did not require ZB to describe the debt as
"FORGIVEN," ZB chose to describe the debt that way. In fact, in the IRS instructions for
Box 4, the IRS merely requires "a description of the origin of the debt, such as student
loan, mortgage, or credit card expenditure." See page 6 of ZB's Addendum 4. Rather than
comply with the IRS's instructions, ZB chose to describe the Note as forgiven. Even if
ZB believed that the 1099-C was merely a reporting tool, it does not alter the fact that ZB
chose to describe the Note as "FORGIVEN." The message this unambiguous language
sent to Crapo is entirely unrelated to the message ZB intended to send to the IRS and is
plainly inconsistent with its present attempt to collect on the Note. This alone establishes
that a genuine dispute of fact exists as to whether ZB engaged in inconsistent conduct and
should be estopped from collecting on the Note.
Moreover, as noted in his opening brief, Crapo also provided proof of other
disputes of fact regarding ZB's inconsistent conduct. For example, not only did ZB tell
Crapo that the Note was forgiven, ZB also took no actions to collect the Note for four
years (Rec. 403, 420-21) and charged off the debt. (Rec. 428). Plainly, ZB has taken
inconsistent positions with regards to the Note and the district court erred in finding that
there was no genuine dispute of fact as to whether ZB engaged in inconsistent conduct.
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B. A Genuine Dispute ofMaterial Fact Exists as to Whether Crapo Reasonably
Relied upon ZB's Inconsistent Conduct
From 2010 until the commencement of this suit, ZB corresponded with Crapo
three times regarding the Note: (1) a demand letter in October 2010, (2) a demand letter
in November 2010, and lastly, (3) the 1099-C describing the Note as forgiven in
January 2014. (Rec. 403; 414; 421-22) Following receipt of the 1099-C, Crapo reported
the full value of the debt as income on his taxes, and otherwise arranged his finances
believing the debt was extinguished. Whether it was reasonable for Crapo to rely on these
statements by ZB and act as if the debt was "FORGIVEN" is a question of fact for the
jury. See, e.g., Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1067 (Utah 1996)
(holding that "the question of reasonable reliance is usually a matter within the province
of the jury"); Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 860 (Utah 1979) ("What is reasonable is a
question of fact."). Put another way, it is a genuine issue of fact whether it is reasonable
for a debtor to include the full value of a debt as income in his tax returns (and take other
actions) when the lender, after three years of silence, tells the debtor that the debt has
been forgiven.
Attempting to avoid the trial court's reversal, ZB contends that it was
unreasonable for Crapo to interpret the phrase "FORGIVEN DEBT AMT 3 YRS NO
PAYMENT" in the 1099-C as meaning the debt was forgiven. According to ZB, the only
reasonable interpretation of this phrase is that it correlates with the designated
"identifiable event." However, it is just as reasonable to read the phrase as "FORGIVEN
DEBT AMT [because of13 YRS NO PAYMENT." See Smith v. Four Corners Mental
4

Health Ctr., 2003 UT 23, ~ 2, 70 P.3d 904 (the Court must view the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, in this case, Crapo). At the very least, Crapo's different interpretation of the
language of the 1099-C creates an issue of fact as to whether his reliance was reasonable.
Moreover, ZB argues that "a party cannot reasonable rely upon oral statements by
the opposing party in light of contrary written information." Opposition at 20 (quoting
Gold Standard, Inc., 915 P.2d at 1068 (Utah 1996». ZB argues therefrom that the nonwaiver provision of the Note made it unreasonable for Crapo to rely upon ZB's more than
three years of inactivity. According to ZB, its three years of silence was like an "oral
statement" that contradicted the writing in the Note. However, as previously noted by
Crapo, this case does not involve only the passage of time, it also involves the affirmative
statement by ZB that the Note was forgiven. (Rec. 308) For ZB to conclude that the nonwaiver provision is applicable, ZB ignores its own written statement that the Note was
"FORGIVEN DEBT."
Faced with these facts, the district court erred in finding that there were no
disputes of fact under the second element of estoppel. It was for the jury to decide
whether Crapo reasonably relied upon ZB's statement that the debt was forgiven, coupled
with more than three years of inactivity.
C. A Genuine Dispute ofMaterial Fact Exists in Relation to the Whether Crapo
was Injured

Crapo created a genuine dispute of material fact in relation to the third element of
estoppel by showing that he will be injured if ZB is allowed to contradict and repudiate
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its prior affirmations. Crapo has already paid taxes on the full value of the Note. (Re.
403) Furthermore, Crapo has relied upon ZB's affirmations and has taken no steps to pay
the Note or to create the financial ability to pay the Note. Therefore, should ZB be
allowed to retract its prior acts and statements, Crapo would be harmed by paying the
value of a Note he reported to the IRS as income and that he understood to have been
forgiven.
ZB argues that this is insufficient to show that Crapo was harmed by his reliance
on ZB's inconsistent conduct. According to ZB, Crapo has not created an issue of fact
because he has not shown the amount of his damage. See Opposition at 22-23. However,
the amount of injury is not at issue presently, merely the existence of an injury. See

Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, ,-r 14. Moreover, the cases relied upon
by ZB on this point are inapposite. In the first, [XL. Stores Co. v. Success Markets, the
case was on appeal following a jury trial, not following a summary judgment ruling that
cut off the need for a determination of the amount of harm. 97 P.2d 577 (Utah 1939). In
the second, Whitaker v. Utah State Ret. Bd., the party "failed to show any actual reliance
upon or injury resulting from" the other party's inconsistent conduct. 2008 UT App 282,

,-r 28, 191 P.3d 814. Having failed to establish the elements of estoppel in that case, the
question of the amount of damages was not before the court. See id. In contrast, all Crapo
need show here is that he was injured. The facts presented to the court below (and
restated to this Court) created a genuine issue of fact as to whether he was harmed.
Relying upon ZB's statement that the Note was forgiven, Crapo reported the value of the
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Note as income and arranged his finances accordingly. It is for the jury to decide whether
this shows that Crapo was harmed.
Having created a genuine dispute of material fact in relation to the elements of
estoppel, the trial court should have denied ZB 's motion for summary judgment and
conducted a trial on the merits. This Court should therefore reverse the trial court's
decision and remand this case for trial.

II.

CRAPO CREATED GENUINE DISPUTES OF FACT AS TO
WHETHER ZB ACTUALLY DISCHARGED CRAPO'S OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE NOTE.
ZB argues that it did not actually discharge the Note because there was no signed

writing as required by the statute of frauds.! Once again, ZB' s argument misses the mark.
While it is true that "every credit agreement" is void unless memorialized in writing, see
UTAH CODE § 25-5-4(1)(f), that does not preclude the possibility that the Note was
2

discharged by ZB. The statute of frauds does not require a detailed memorandum just a
"cryptic, abbreviated, and incomplete" writing. Coulter & Smith Ltd. v. Russell, 1999 UT
App 055,

~

15 n.2, 976 P.2d 1218. What matters is that the note is "adequate, when

considered with the admitted facts, the surrounding circumstances and all ... evidence, to
convince the court that there is no serious possibility of consummating a fraud by
1 Below, the trial court asked ZB "Under banking law, what does it take to quote,
unquote, discharge a debt?" ZB's response: "I don't know." (R. 807). Nevertheless, ZB
now contends that a signed agreement is necessary to effectuate a discharge of a debt. In
contrast, Crapo cited a statute to the trial court that allows "A person entitled to enforce
an instrument, with or without consideration" to unilaterally extinguish the obligation
evidenced by the instrument. (R. 821-22). Thus, a signed agreement may not be needed
for ZB to discharge the Note.
2 UTAH CODE § 25-5-4(2)(a) does not include "extinguish," "discharge," or "forgive"
within the definition of a credit agreement.
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enforcement." English v. Standard Optical Co., 841 P.2d 613,616 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(internal citation omitted). In this case, the 1099-C, coupled with the surrounding
circumstances, provides the Court with ample proof that enforcement of ZB 's
pronouncement that the Note was "FORGIVEN" will not consummate a fraud.
Therefore, the statute of frauds is no bar to Crapo's claim.
Only one case has addressed whether a 1099-C satisfies the statute of frauds. See

Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Nicholas, 812 A.2d 51 (Conn. Ct. App. 2002). In that
case, similar to here, Franklin Credit sought to foreclose on a note, but the defendant
argued that the debt "was discharged and released" as shown by a Form 1099-C issued by
Franklin Credit.ld. at 838. At issue there was a statute that provided that a debt may be
cancelled by the lender, "with or without consideration," by either an intentional
voluntary act (similar to UTAH CODE § 70a-3-604, which allows a beneficiary of an
obligation to unilaterally discharge the obligation "with or without consideration"), or by
agreeing to renounce its rights by a "signed writing" (similar to Utah's statute of frauds).

ld. at 839. In that case, the court not only found that the 1099-C was prima facie evidence
of a discharge, it also found that the 1099-C "constitute[d] a signed writing" and satisfied
the statutory requirement for a signed writing.ld. at 842-43. The same result should be
found here. Even if the statute of frauds applies to ZB's unilateral discharge of the Note,
the 1099-C constitutes a sufficient "note or memorandum" of that agreement to satisfy
the statute of frauds. See UTAH CODE § 25-5-4(1).
Having overcome this technical barrier, the issue remains whether the "contextual
clues" presented to the trial court were sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to
8

whether ZB discharged the Note. They were. As previously noted, the facts and all
inference drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to Crapo. In this
light, the plain language of the 1099-C ("FORGIVEN DEBT") coupled with ZB's nearly
four years of inaction, discharge of the debt, and other statements and actions, provides
sufficient proof to create an issue of fact for the jury as to whether ZB discharged the
Note. Therefore, the trial court should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the trial court's order granting summary judgment in
favor of ZB and remand this case back to the trial court for a trial on the merits.
DATED this 26th day of October, 2016.
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